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The objective of this investigation was to establish the geospatial risk of occurrence of
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) in Guyana at the Neighborhood Democratic Council (NDC)
level. Knowledge based multicriteria analysis was used taking into account various risk factors
adjusted to the spatial resolution of the administrative districts of the country. First the risk of
introduction of the causing virus was deduced and then the risk of exposure. From these two risks, by
means of algebra of maps with the geographic information system QGIS version 2.18.10, the risk
occurrence of disease was deduced. Equivalent proportions of districts with very high or high risk
were highlighted, with 28 of 116 (24.1 %) in each category. The remainder of the districts in
descending order of risk classes grouped as low and negligible in 34 (29.3 %) NDC. The regions that
corresponded to high risk were: Barima-Waini with 2 out of 5 districts in this category; Pomeroon -
Supenaam with 2 out of 7 districts; Essequibo Islands - West Demerara with 5 out of 19 districts (26
%); Demerara-Mahaica with 5 out of 19 districts (26 %); East Berbice - Corentyne with 8 out of 21
districts (38 %) and Upper Takutu - Upper Essequibo with 2 out of 8. The geospatial risk of
occurrence of HPAI was not distributed evenly in Guyana, which presents an opportunity for
prioritization strategies including the development and implementation of a risk-based surveillance
system.
highly pathogenic avian influenza, multicriteria disease analysis, risk, surveillance,
prioritization.
El objetivo de esta investigación fue establecer el riesgo geoespacial de ocurrencia de
influenza aviar altamente patógena (IAAP) en Guyana a nivel del Consejo Democrático Vecinal
(CDV). Se aplicó análisis multicriterio basado en conocimiento teniendo en cuenta diversos factores
de riesgo ajustados a la resolución espacial de los distritos administrativos del país. Se establecieron de
forma independiente el riesgo de introducción y de exposición al virus causal. A partir de estos dos
riesgos, mediante el álgebra de mapas con el sistema de información geográfica QGIS versión 2.18.10,
se dedujo el riesgo de ocurrencia de la enfermedad. Se destacaron proporciones equivalentes de
distritos con riesgo muy alto o alto, con 28 de 116 (24,1 %) en cada categoría. El resto de los distritos
en orden descendente de clases de riesgo, se agrupó como bajo y despreciable en 34 (29,3 %) CDV.
Las regiones que correspondieron a alto riesgo fueron: Barima-Waini con 2 de 5 distritos en esta
categoría; Pomeroon -Supenaam con 2 de 7 distritos; Islas Esequibo - West Demerara con 5 de 19
distritos; Demerara-Mahaica con 5 de 19 distritos; East Berbice - Corentyne con 8 de 21 distritos y
Upper Takutu - Upper Essequibo con 2 de 8. El riesgo geoespacial de ocurrencia de IAAP no se
distribuyó de manera uniforme en Guyana, lo que presenta una oportunidad para estrategias de
priorización, incluido el desarrollo e implementación de un sistema de vigilancia basado en el riesgo.
influenza aviar altamente patógena, análisis multicriterio, riesgo, vigilancia,
priorización.
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INTRODUCTION
Avian influenza (AI), given its impact on
poultry farming (the livestock sub-sector that
provides the most affordable source of animal
protein worldwide) has important implications
for global food security. On the other hand, the
zoonotic nature of some strains and the
underlying risk of causing a pandemic has
resulted in it being given priority attention by
relevant international organizations (1).
AI can be markedly cross-border and is
extremely difficult to eradicate particularly in
developing countries where it can become
endemic (2). In the last 10 years, more than 200
million birds distributed in more than 70
countries have been destroyed as a result of
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)
outbreaks (3).
In the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the
poultry subsector is the most developed and
integrated in livestock Industry, and it generates
jobs for approximately 18,000 people (Fernandes,
2019; personal communication). Local poultry
population exceed 15 million, distributed in 717
farms (3). On the other hand, annual production
of chicken (41 922 MT) and eggs (32.08 million)
guarantee self-sufficiency in the national
consumption of these products and a slight export
margin in the case of eggs (4). The poultry
production model involves the importation of
fertile eggs that are incubated locally, and the
chicks are sold to poultry farmers (5).
Additionally, Guyana is very rich in
biodiversity (6) which is commercially exploited
and constitutes an important economic activity
locally (7). The wildlife trade provides 439 direct
jobs and temporary income to some 7,540
trappers and national traders, while the total
number of people who benefit economically from
this activity can be approximately 20,000,
particularly indigenous people from the interior
of the country; almost all communities are
involved in the business (8).
The devastating consequences of AI on the
poultry sector, given the significant economic
losses caused by both the slaughter and
destruction of birds and the closure of export
markets (9-11) and the potential Implications for
public health justify continued attention to this
disease. Since most countries prohibit imports
from those affected by AI, the presence of the
disease in Guyana would impact both poultry and
wild bird trade that constitute livelihoods for a
significant proportion of the population.
On the other hand, the possibility of interaction
between wildlife and domesticated animals is
considered an important disease emergency
factor (12-15) when promoting translocation of
pathogens in the wildlife-domestic animal
interface. AI is one of the most recent examples
of hazards in this interface, even with
implications for public health (16,17).
Guyana is outside the main routes of migratory
waterfowl, but it has several sites where there are
populations of resident wild ducks. It is
recognized that ducks can excrete large amounts
of influenza virus without manifesting symptoms
(18), while the virus may have high persistence in
aquatic ecosystems (19-22). On the other hand,
rice production which is vital to the country’s
economy (23) also favors the occurrence of AI
outbreaks (24-27).
The above factors could favor the occurrence
of AI in Guyana, but its territorial distribution
and importance are unknown. Until now, AI
surveillance in the country has a passive
component dependent on the willingness of
farmers to report mortality and additionally
veterinarians and technicians visit farms to
observe clinically if there are sick birds, deaths,
etc. In addition, blood samples are collected and
sent to the laboratory for evaluation (28).
Although risk-based surveillance is the most
efficient and effective alternative for rapid alert
to the introduction of AI (26,29,30) this type of
surveillance is not yet applicable in Guyana and
could be an alternative to increase the efficiency
of the human and financial resources dedicated to
surveillance. Guyana reports a population of
more than 15 million poultry, distributed in 717
establishments, while the local veterinary
technical force is 170 professionals of which only
31 are from the public service (3).
Moreover, the territorial extension of the
country (214,970 km2), the dispersion of poultry
establishments and the existence of other forms
of production such as backyard, represent a
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demand for the development and implementation
of risk-based surveillance systems. The objective
of this study was to establish the geospatial risk
occurrence of highly pathogenic avian influenza
in Guyana at the Neighborhood Democratic
Council (NDC) level.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study area
The analysis covered the entire Cooperative
Republic of Guyana located in the northeastern
part of South America and part of the South
American Caribbean, bordering the north with
the Atlantic Ocean, east with Suriname, west
with Venezuela and south with Brazil (Fig. 1).
Collection of fundamental data and
generation of geospacial layers of risk
factors
The relevant database of commercial poultry
farms, ducks, backyard chickens, poultry
slaughterhouses, fighting cock arenas, sites and
average number of domestic wild ducks and live
bird markets were collected from the Guyana
Livestock Development Authority (GLDA).
Subsequently, the collected data was transferred
to Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and there after
georeferenced via the program QGIS 2.18.10.
using Open Street map. Data for which geo-
referencing was not available, geographical
coordinates were obtained via the Gazetteer of
Guyana. Shape files were created for each risk
factor collected and georeferenced in the program
QGIS 2.18.10.
Unofficial ports of entry, land border crossing
sites and illegal cross-border trade points were
collected from the Animal Health Unit of the
GLDA. The same procedure of georeferencing
and the creation of shape file was followed for
these risk factors as mentioned earlier.
Other important cartographic data such as the
administrative division of Guyana and road
density were obtained from the public site http://
www.diva-gis.org-data. The official ports and
airports were obtained through the site's natural
land data: naturalearthdata.com <cultural large
scale˃ airports and ports. In the case of road
density, vector <street map ˃ download data˃
from layer was used.
 
Figure 1. Location of Guyana and administrative division by regions (1 - Barima Waini; 2 -
Pomeroon-Supenaam; 3 - Essequibo Islands - West Demerara; 4 - Demerara - Mahica; 5 - Mahica -
Berbice; 6 - East Berbice - Corentyne; 7 - Cuyini - Mazaruni; 8 - Potaro - Siparuni; 9 - Upper Takutu -
Upper Essequibo; 10 - Upper Demerara - Upper Berbice). Self-developed map using QGIS./
Ubicación de Guyana y división administrativa por regiones (1 - Barima Waini; 2 - Pomeroon-
Supenaam; 3 - Essequibo Islands - West Demerara; 4 - Demerara - Mahica; 5 - Mahica - Berbice; 6 -
East Berbice - Corentyne; 7 - Cuyini - Mazaruni; 8 - Potaro - Siparuni; 9 - Upper Takutu - Upper
Essequibo; 10 - Upper Demerara - Upper Berbice). Mapa de desarrollo propio usando QGIS.
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Preparation and unification of the
thematic layers
The HPAI risk occurrence was established
based on the estimation of the risks of
introduction and exposure in independent
thematic layers and their subsequent
standardization and unification in a single map.
The geoprocessing of the data was performed
using the geographic information system QGIS
version 2.18.10 in the coordinate system WGS 84
projected in UTM 21N. The thematic layers were
elaborated and unified by overlapping with the
algebra map tool.
Risk for the introduction of HPAI
The risk for the introduction of HPAI was
based on the semi-quantitative multicriteria risk
analysis methodology based on knowledge
described by León (31). For the determination of
the risk factors to be included in the model, the
following assumptions were considered:
• The country is free of the disease.
• The virus can enter through wild migratory
birds.
• The virus can enter through the legal or illegal
trade of live birds or their products.
• The virus can enter through the legal or illegal
trade of wild birds.
• The virus can enter through the movement of
people.
• Backyard chickens are a potential source of
local multiplication and spread of the virus.
• Commercial production backyard chickens
constitute a potential source for mass
dissemination of the disease.
• The areas where wild domestic ducks,
backyard chickens and commercial poultry
coexist are those with the highest risk of
disease occurrence.
Modifications were made to the methodology
of León (31) described by Coste (32). Other
considerations were that Guyana is outside the
migratory waterfowl route, so this factor was
ruled out. In the case of wetlands, given the rich
hydrography of the country, this factor is present
with similar distribution throughout the national
territory, so it was discarded from processing as a
factor because it would not have changed the
importance of the variable. Similar consideration
was made with regards to rice fields. Domestic
wild ducks sites and the average number of ducks
at these sites were used. Unofficial ports and land
border crossings were considered as places where
there is illegal trade of poultry, poultry products
and wild birds.
Ponderation and addition of the risk of
introduction
The procedure consisted of preparing thematic
maps from a setting of weight for each risk factor
considering values of 0 or 1 that were assigned
by polygons if the factor was absent or present,
respectively. In each case, the value obtained was
multiplied by the weighting factor that appears in
Table 1 and the final value of the polygon was
the sum of the weighting products of each factor.
 
Table 1. Ponderation of risk factors for
introduction. /Ponderación de los factores de
riesgo para la introducción.
Risk Factor Ponderation
Official Ports 4
International Airports 4
Land border crossing 7
Unofficial ports 6
Total 21
 
The risk was performed using the raster
calculator, the new map was generated, based on
the following equation:
HPAI exposure risk
The determination of the risk factors for
exposure was based on the review of
bibliographies relating to the subject (26,27,29).
Hence, the ponderation of the risk factors was
realized by way of expert opinion from the
Caribbean Animal Health Network (CaribVET),
The French Agriculture Centre for International
Development (CIRAD), and the United States
Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant
[(Offical ports × 4) + (International Airports ×
4) + (Land border crossing × 7) + (Unofficial
Ports × 6)] / 21
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Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS).
Farms with less than 100 chickens were
considered equivalent to backyard production;
due to the low levels of biosecurity and the
rearing of various species. In each case, the value
correspond to presence or absence was multiplied
by ponderation of the risk factor shown in
Table 2. The final value of the polygon was the
sum of the ponderation results of each factor.
 
Table 2. Ponderation of exposure risk factors. /
Ponderación de los factores de riesgo de
exposición.
Risk Factors Ponderation
Live bird Markets 10
Domestic wild ducks sites 9
Duck farms 8
Fighting cocks arenas 7
Poultry slaughter houses 7
Roads 6
Backyard chicken 6
Commercial poultry 5
Total 58
Risk of HPAI in Guyana
In all cases the results were normalized by the
equation:
where Z was the standardized value of Xi, i is
the index of X, while Xmax and Xmin are
respectively the maximum and the minimum
value that the variable X took.
The distribution of values was divided into
quantiles assigned in descending order into very
high risk (1st quantile), high risk (2nd quantile),
low risk (3rd quantile) and negligible risk (4th
quantile).
The risk calculation was performed using the
raster calculator, and the new map was generated,
based on the following equation:
 
Zi  = Xi− XminXmax− Xmin
[(Official Ports 4) + (International Airports ×
4) + (Land border crossing × 7) + (Unofficial
Ports × 6) (Live birds markets × 10)+(Wild
Anatidae × 9) + (Duck farms × 8) + (Fighting
cocks arenas × 7) + (Slaughter houses × 7) +
(Roads × 6) + (Backyard chickens × 6) +
(Commercial farms × 5)] / 80
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
HPAI risk occurrence in Guyana
The geospatial combination of the introduction
and exposure risks revealed a variable
distribution of the risk occurrence (Figure 2),
modeled by multicriteria analysis. Equivalent
proportions of districts with very high or high
risk with 28 of 116 NDC’s (24.1 %) in each
category stand out. The rest of the districts in
descending order of risk classes grouped as low
in 34 (29.3 %) and negligible in the rest.
The regions that corresponded to very high
risks were: Pomeroon-Supenaam with four (4)
out of seven (7) NDCs in this category;
Essequibo Islands - West Demerara with 13 of 19
NDCs and Mahaica-Berbice with five (5) out of
11 of the NDCs .
The regions that corresponded to high risk
were: Barima -Waini with two (2) out of (5)
NDCs in this category; Pomeroon-Supernaam
with two (2) out of (7) NDCs; Essequibo Islands
- West Demerara with five (5) out of 19 NDCs;
Demerara-Mahaica with five (5) out of 19
NDC’s; East Berbice - Corentyne with 8 out of
21 NDCs and Upper Takutu - Upper Essequibo
with 2 out of 8 NDCs. In four (4) of these six (6)
regions there are entry points or risk factors for
introduction that include ports (official and
unofficial), airports and land border crossing
areas.
Three of these six regions (50 %) have vast
borders shared with other countries. In particular,
land border crossings and unofficial ports which
are not well regulated and are recognized as
enabling factors for unofficial movement of
animals (33). Exposure risk factors were also
present in these regions, but their densities were
lower and did not change the distribution of the
risk occurrence. These factors included: the
presence of domestic wild ducks sites and
number, duck farms, poultry slaughterhouses and
backyard poultry.
In the Demerara-Mahaica Region, there is the
Georgetown municipality which is the capital of
the country with very high risk. This is due to the
fact that the major official-ports of entry and one
unofficial port are present in this district. These
factors, together with the presence of live bird
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markets (LBM’s) in Georgetown, which have
very high ponderation for the exposure risk
according to Biswas (34) and Khan (35).
LBM’s are essential for marketing poultry in
many developing countries and are the preferred
place for many people to buy poultry for
consumption worldwide (36). LBM’s are
typically urban and have a permanent structure in
which poultry can stay until they are sold. Such
practice encourages the mixing of poultry species
to meet the preferences of their customers
however, these birds are commonly farmed by
multiple suppliers. The mixing of species, the
lack of comprehensive management and multiple
suppliers are characteristics that make the LBM’s
a potential source of influenza viruses, especially
in their supply lots. LBM’s have been linked to
many outbreaks of avian influenza internationally
(37).
Henning (2) added that the high prevalence of
the HPAI virus observed in LBM’s is probably
related to the duration of the poultry that remain
in the commercial chain before being sold in
LBM and is influenced by the number and
frequency of susceptible bird contacts with
infected birds or with surfaces contaminated with
the HPAI virus. LBMs are given high importance
because in addition to promoting the maintenance
of AIV (38,39) they have been associated with
the occurrence of human infections (40,41).
In the distribution of the risk occurrence
realized in this investigation, the presence of
backyard chickens was given an average weight
in comparison with the other risk factors.
However, the importance of this factor has been
variable in epidemics that occurred in various
countries (36,42-44). However, this type of
poultry can be important for the livelihoods of
some small producers.
This research is the first of its kind done in
Guyana to estimate HPAI risk occurrence, which
was achieved by combining the risk of
introduction of the agent and that of exposure of
the susceptible population through map algebra.
The use of multicriteria analysis for the modeling
of geospatial risk of disease occurrence
recognizes several advantages related to the
possibility of considering in the same
geographical space the presence and importance
of various risk factors (26,45,46).
Knowledge-based multicriteria analysis
methods were also utilized (26) as an alternative
 
Figure 2. Highly pathogenic avian influenza risk occurrence in Guyana, October 2019. / Ocurrencia
de riesgo de influenza aviar altamente patógena en Guyana, octubre de 2019.
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in the absence of disease data because it is a
disease-free country. The study is focused on the
HPAI because for this form of the disease, there
is more available data on diffusion and risk
factors to establish knowledge-based models
through multicriteria analysis (26,29,47,48).
However, the identified risk areas are useful in
general to increase the effectiveness of
surveillance in both forms of the disease (HPAI
and low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI)).
Given the territorial extension of Guyana
(214,970 km2), as well as the presence and
dispersion of multiple forms of poultry
production, including the commercialization of
live birds that must be controlled with a limited
number of veterinary and paraveterinary
personnel, the present study constitutes the
possibility of prioritizing resources for early
warning and prevention based on scientific
evidence of risk. In particular, risk-based
surveillance combines the ability to increase the
sensitivity of the system with the optimization of
the use of both human and financial resources, so
it’s the best cost-effective method to guarantee
rapid alert and timely response (49).
Being the wild bird trade an important activity
in Guyana, it was not considered in the AIV
introduction risk. Nonetheless, most of the wild
birds that are usually traded are macaws and
parrots (7), hence do not belong to the orders
(Anseriformes and Charadriiformes) in which the
main AIV reservoirs have been identified
(24-27). Moreover, more precise data on the flow
of wild birds and the potential spatio-temporal
coincidence of their catching and
commercialization with the raising of poultry will
be needed for risk assessment.
The present study responds to a demand for
development of surveillance in the country and
lays the foundation for the implementation of a
risk-based rapid alert system. Additionally, the
capacities for risk management are benefited,
through the priority strengthening of biosecurity.
This is important because avian influenza viruses
can remain in their reservoirs as low pathogenic
(LP) strains (50) which makes it more difficult to
detect using passive surveillance. However, the
circulation of LP H5 and H7 subtypes when they
infect poultry, they have the ability to mutate to
HPAI in variable and indeterminate time (51).
In fact, reports of outbreaks of avian influenza
in the Caribbean so far involve LP strains and
have affected three countries; Haiti, Belize and
the Dominican Republic, with recurrences and an
event currently active in the latter (3).
Coincidentally, all reported outbreaks in the
Caribbean have been caused by the H5N2
subtype for which phylogenetic relationship has
also been reported between isolates and even
with the virus of the same subtype that circulated
previously in Mexico (52). There is no clarity
with respect to the origin of outbreaks in the
Caribbean, while the phylogenetic relationship
exists between isolates in different and distant
countries. This could be due to a common origin
of the strains from their natural reservoir which
could also be indicative of contact between
countries using different routes.
CONCLUSION
The geospatial risk occurrence of highly
pathogenic avian influenza is distributed in a
variable manner in Guyana, which constitutes an
opportunity for the development and
implementation of a risk-based surveillance
system and prioritized the allocation of resources
to reduce vulnerabilities.
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